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Tradicionalmente, los economistas políticos han sido indiferentes a la 
construcción comunicativa del dinero y la banca central en la esfera 
pública. Esta no les importa cuando los asuntos monetarios se convier-
ten en un juego racional encaminado a preservar el valor de la moneda 
o toman la forma de un juego de moral medieval. Este artículo sugiere 
que la economía política de la independencia del banco central exige 
alejarse de dicha práctica. Argumenta que la coordinación comunicativa 
del juego monetario es esencial para saber de qué manera los bancos 
centrales independientes pueden lograr la efi ciencia institucional y 
por qué no enfrentan un trade-off entre efi ciencia institucional y 
legitimidad democrática. Sugiere, en particular, que un banco central 
institucionalmente efi ciente no puede actuar más que como un agente 
de empoderamiento comunicativo para la audiencia proporcionándole el 
contexto local para sus actividades.
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Abstract
Tognato, Carlo. “Is institutional effi ciency in independent central 
banking a communicative matter?”, Cuadernos de Economía, v. XXIV, n. 
42, Bogotá, 2005, pages 117-134
Political economists have traditionally been indifferent to the com-
municative construction of money and central banking in the public 
sphere. It does not matter to them whether monetary affairs become a 
rational game aimed at preserving the value of currency or take on the 
form of a medieval morality play. This paper suggests that the very 
political economy of central bank independence requires a departure 
from such practice. It is argued that communicative coordination of 
the monetary game is relevant to understanding how independent cen-
tral banks can achieve institutional effi ciency and why they face no 
trade-off between institutional effi ciency and democratic legitimacy. 
It is particularly suggested that an institutionally effi cient central 
bank cannot but act as an agent of communicative empowerment for the 
audience providing the local context for its operation.
Key words: independent central bank, communication, democracy. JEL: 
E58, E59. 
Résumé
Tognato, Carlo. “L´effi cacité institutionnelle dans la banque centrale 
indépendante, une affaire de communication?”, Cuadernos de Economía, 
v. XXIV, n. 42, Bogotá, 2005, pages 117-134
Traditionnellement, les économistes politiques sont restés indifférents 
à la construction communicative de l´argent et de la banque centrale 
dans la sphère publique. Elle leur importe peu quand les affaires mo-
nétaires deviennent, un jeu rationnel dont le but est de préserver la 
valeur de la monnaie, ou prennent la forme d´un jeu moraliste médiéval. 
Cet article suggère que l´économie politique de l´indépendance de la 
banque centrale exige de s´éloigner de cette pratique. Il argumente 
que la coordination communicative du jeu monétaire est essentielle 
pour savoir de quelle façon les banques centrales indépendantes peuvent 
obtenir une effi cacité institutionnelle et pourquoi elles n´affrontent 
pas un trade-off (compromis) entre l´effi cacité institutionnelle et la 
légitimité démocratique. Il suggère, en particulier, qu´une banque 
centrale institutionnellement effi cace ne peut agir que comme un agent 
de contrôle de la communication pour l´audience en lui proportionnant 
un contexte local pour ses activités.
Mots clés: banque centrale indépendante, communication, démocratie. 
JEL: E58, E59.
1. INTRODUCTION
Independent central banks have emerged world-wide during the past three 
decades as the epitome of economic rationality. It is therefore not surpri-
sing that public discourse has commonly treated them in technical terms. 
However, technical discourse has not been the only mode of representing 
money and central banking. Scherbacher-Posé (1999) has observed (in an 
extremely rare contribution towards the language of monetary affairs) that 
war, life and death, health, birth and childhood, physics and technology, sea, 
sport, building, marriage and “legions of religious metaphors” have provided 
alternative fi elds of representation to talk about money and central banking. 
The Harvard theologian Harvey Cox (1999) has recently remarked that,
The lexicon of the Wall Street Journal and the business sections of Time and 
Newsweek […] bear a striking resemblance to Genesis, the Epistle to the 
Romans and Saint Augustine’s City of God. Behind descriptions of market 
reforms, monetary policy and the convolutions of the Dow, I gradually made 
out pieces of a grand narrative about the inner meaning of human history, 
why things had gone wrong and how to put them right. Theologians call these 
myths of origin, legends of the fall, and doctrines of sin and redemption. But 
here they are again, and in only thin disguise (Cox 1999, 19).
The political analyst Edward Luttwak (1997, C1) took Cox’s remark even 
further when referring to central banking,
A new religion has arisen in the world, all the more powerful for not being 
recognised as such. Let’s call it Central Bankism. It is the faith of the men 
who control the banks of the world’s leading economic powers. Like most 
religions, Central Bankism has both a supreme god – hard money – and a 
devil – infl ation (Luttwak 1997, C1).
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The Financial Times has drawn directly on a popular cultural saga that re-
tains the structural features of religion for an ironic rendition of monetary 
affairs,
For a thousand generations the Jedi knights have ensured peace and justice 
throughout the galaxy. But now the Jedi High Council is facing the Phantom 
Menace (cue Star Wars’ theme music). Meanwhile, in our own time and galaxy, 
the Bank of England’s monetary policy committee (MPC) has ensured the 
kingdom’s prosperity for a rather briefer period. […] Nevertheless, the MPC, 
like the Jedi Council, is facing a menace. But will it turn out to be a phantom 
one? […] The problem for the MPC might be tougher than the one threaten-
ing the Jedi Council. A Jedi knows that when he senses a disturbance in the 
living force it is a sure sign of danger. […] But the MPC has far less precise 
data to go on, ranging from offi cial statistics to anecdotal evidence. Armed 
only with such unreliable information it has to plot a course between two evils 
[…] the evil Darth Infl ation […] and the equally nasty Darth Recession (The 
Financial Times 1999, 3).
To date, political economists have been indifferent to the plurality of for-
ms of representing money and central banking in the public sphere. It has 
not mattered to them whether monetary affairs are rendered as a rational 
game concerning preserving the value of currency or whether they take 
on the form of a morality play. This paper suggests that the very political 
economy of central bank independence requires a departure from such 
practice. Communicative coordination of the monetary game is relevant 
to understanding how independent central banks can achieve institutional 
effi ciency and why they face no trade-off between institutional effi ciency and 
democratic legitimacy. An institutionally effi cient central bank cannot but 
act as an agent of communicative empowerment for the audience forming 
the local context for its operation.
Susanne Lohmann’s audience-cost theory of institutional commitment 
will be outlined in section 2 as it provides a suitable framework for un-
derstanding the link between institutional effi ciency and communication. 
Section 3 gives her theory’s communicative presuppositions. Section 4 deals 
with their implications for trade-off between institutional effi ciency and 
democratic legitimacy in independent central banking; it will be argued 
that there is no trade-off between democratic legitimacy and institutional 
effi ciency and that the former is necessary for achieving the latter. Section 
5 will address the frequent charge against independent central banks that 
they can afford to eschew democratic rationality as a result of the declining 
effectiveness of formal democratic checks upon economic agencies in an age 
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of economic globalisation. Some of the topics that lie ahead for a research 
programme based on communication in independent central banking will 
then be mentioned.
2. LOHMANN’S AUDIENCE-COST THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL 
COMMITMENT IN TERMS OF THE QUESTION OF INSTITUTIONAL 
EFFICIENCY IN CENTRAL BANKING
Central bank designers have traditionally regarded central bank indepen-
dence as an institutional solution to the infl ationary bias resulting from two 
problems inherent in discretionary monetary policy: time-consistency and 
political interference in monetary policy-making for electoral or partisan 
purposes. Designers have proposed a number of statutory rules for solving 
such problems aimed at regulating the appointment and dismissal of cen-
tral bank offi cials, establishing the length of their tenure, identifying the 
incompatibility of their offi ce with other offi ces, defi ning monetary policy’s 
ultimate goals, specifying policy targets and laying down punishments for 
central bank offi cials in case they deviate from such targets1. They have 
intended to make central bank independence more costly to reverse by 
including such rules in central bank statutes, thereby increasing monetary 
delegation’s credibility.
Designers have also observed that an independent central bank should still 
retain an incentive for accommodating the principal under extraordinary 
conditions such as major economic shocks, war, or humanitarian disaster 
and to react to any surprise which may arise as a result of the deeply uncer-
tain environment in which a central bank operates. Lohmann (1992) has 
shown that accommodation in these cases can prevent the principal from 
permanently disrupting statutory independence.
Monetary institution designers have striven to fi nd an optimum solution 
for the trade-off between credibility and fl exibility (i.e. they have aimed at 
producing institutionally effi cient designs).
While addressing the trade-off between credibility and fl exibility in moneta-
ry delegation, monetary institution designers have traditionally assumed that 
a central bank would face a sole homogenous audience. Lohmann (2003) 
has relaxed this assumption, showing that it will only be possible to fully 
1  Eijffi nger and De Haan (1996), Cuckierman (1992).
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appreciate how a well-designed monetary institution solves the trade-off 
between credibility and fl exibility by looking at the collection of audiences 
pertaining to a monetary institution. Lohmann (2003, 100) has stated that 
designing monetary institutions is all about selecting an appropriate menu 
of audiences for effectively monitoring such institution and punish policy-
makers’ intrusions into the workings of the institution. The audience cost 
will give credibility to policy-makers’ commitment.
Lohmann has observed that there are two relevant types of audience di-
ffering in terms of their ability to assess whether institutional defections 
are grounded and therefore excusable. The mass electorate can infl ict the 
harshest punishment upon a government by voting it out of offi ce in the 
case of institutional defection; however, the electorate also has an unsophis-
ticated understanding of monetary policy and therefore a low capability of 
discriminating between excusable and inexcusable defections. Lohmann 
has suggested that the simplicity (or non-state-contingence) of trigger-
punishment strategies available to the mass electorate does not only follow 
from the electorate’s low level of information or attention but also from the 
quasi-impossibility of millions of voters to coordinate their beliefs regarding 
a complex (highly state-contingent) trigger-punishment strategy.
Elite audiences (i.e. trade unions, employer organisations, fi nancial insti-
tutions and academic economists) have a sophisticated understanding of 
monetary policy and a high level of information and attention and they can 
therefore discriminate between excusable and inexcusable institutional de-
fections. However, they cannot impose such a harsh punishment as the mass 
electorate can do. Lohmann (2003, 104) has observed that audiences differ 
in the kind of defection they can identify and care about, in their defi nition 
of justifi ed or unjustifi ed defection, in the probability that any punishment 
is executed in equilibrium, in the quality and severity of punishment and 
in the distribution of the burden of any punishment applied.
An audience capable of employing perfectly state-contingent trigger-pu-
nishment strategies and imposing the highest punishment for inexcusable 
institutional defection would produce a credible monetary institution and 
yet one which was fl exible enough to accommodate extraordinary situa-
tions. Such an ideal audience, however, does not exist but it can at least be 
approximated by a collection of audiences which may collectively create a 
complex menu of audience costs. 
The Bundesbank relied upon such a collection of audiences, according to 
Lohmann. The German general public used to adjudicate public confl icts 
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between the Bundesbank and the Federal government but did not monitor 
German central bank reform during 1955-57 and 1992. Instead, the re-
gional states took care of the issue as a result of their ongoing concern with 
any debate impinging upon their own prerogatives vis à vis German federal 
institutions. In the end, neither the general public nor the regional states 
monitored the Bundesbank’s monetary performance; Bundesbank watchers 
did. Although the Bundesbank often failed to meet its monetary targets, it 
could meet their understanding by explaining its deviations to them.
The institution speaks to informationally segmented audiences with the result 
that some aspects of its operations are transparent to some audiences and 
opaque to others. Audience scrutiny generates credibility; but not everything 
the Bundesbank does is scrutinized by everybody all the time, which is what 
generates fl exibility (Lohmann 2003, 106).
After acknowledging the function of effective audience monitoring upon 
central banking, Lohmann (2003) concluded that there is ultimately no 
trade-off between institutional effi ciency and democracy,
Institutionally thick democracy can enter a complex institutional commitment 
[…] whereas an institutionally thin tinpot dictatorship must resort to primitive 
commitment mechanisms (machine guns). Mature democracies have more, 
and more powerful, and more varied audiences (Lohmann 2003, 107-108).
Lohmann sees democracy as a source of social complexity; sheer complexity, 
in turn, is the source of institutional effi ciency. Whilst Lohmann’s theory 
seems correct respecting the effect of audience monitoring of central bank 
effi ciency, her conclusion regarding the relationship between democracy 
and central bank effi ciency is spurious. Institutional effi ciency in indepen-
dent central banking does not result from the complexity-inducing effects 
of democracy but rather from democracy’s communicative function. Two 
steps must be taken beyond her argument to understand why. The notion of 
effective monitoring must be analysed and its communicative preconditions 
be addressed. The relationship between democracy and such communicative 
preconditions must then be accounted for, thereby explaining in what sense 
mature democracies can produce more powerful audiences.
3. INSTITUTIONAL EFFICIENCY AND ITS COMMUNICATIVE 
PRECONDITIONS
It is useful to address Lohmann’s views regarding the debate on policy 
transparency when restating the communicative preconditions for effecti-
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ve audience monitoring. She suggests that the debate in the institutional 
design literature concerning secrecy and independence cf transparency and 
accountability arises from mistaken premises. The question is not whether 
monetary policy-making should be fully secretive or fully transparent vis à 
vis a single homogenous audience but whether information is segmented 
in such a way as to satisfy the collection of audiences attached to a central 
bank (some audiences will need more information while others will be 
content with less) (Lohmann 2003, 106).
Lohmann seems to have in mind an idea of policy transparency as being the 
openness to release information. However, this is only one of two possible 
interpretations of the notion of transparency; the alternative perspective 
is not only consistent with her audience cost theory of institutional com-
mitment but is also the only perspective within which her theory can fully 
realise its potential.
Otmar Issing (1999, 506) has suggested in a lively exchange with Willem 
Buiter (1999) that the idea of policy transparency, “extends beyond mere 
openness,” and cannot be compressed into the belief that more transparency 
is achieved by greater amounts of information. Issing’s reasoning has been 
further developed by Bernhard Winkler (2000)2. Winkler (2000, 7) has 
complained that current literature on policy transparency has adopted a 
simple one-dimensional notion of transparency which boils it down to the 
mere idea of availability of information and that addresses information as 
being a homogenous good; in other words, the more the better. Winkler 
(2000, 9) called for a departure from the standard presumptions of perfect 
rationality, limited uncertainty and homogeneous information, common 
knowledge and friction-less communication to avoid this. He wished for a 
shift in a political economy approach to monetary policy transparency from 
early to later Wittgenstein. Winkler (2000, 7) has defi ned transparency as, 
“a degree of genuine understanding of monetary policy and policy decisions 
by the public,” and took it to be predicated upon sharing communicating 
parties sharing a common language for encoding and decoding messages. 
Winkler (2000) has stated that,
2  Bernhard Winkler worked at Deutsche Bundesbank’s economics department and then 
moved to the European Central Bank. Otmar Issing was Deutsche Bundesbank’s chief 
economist and then moved to the European Central Bank as chief economist and member 
of the executive council.
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The primary task for central bank communication policy would consist of 
making its view of the world commonly understood and making information 
available in a form (or language) that is shared with the public and understood 
across different segments of the public. In order to minimise higher order 
uncertainty about how other agents interpret information, this suggests that 
central banks should avoid using a language that is only understood by a subset 
of the (relevant) public or leaves doubts that it may not be understood in the 
same way (Winkler 2000, 13).
Winkler advocated creating a common basis for understanding between a 
central bank and its reference audiences so that such audiences’ access to 
monetary policy-making would produce genuine understanding.
What implications do Issing and Winkler’s approaches to policy transpa-
rency have on Lohmann’s view of central bank audiences? She has argued 
that a well-designed monetary institution comes attached to a collection of 
audiences that may collectively create a complex menu of audience costs; 
such audiences need different amounts of information to carry out their 
distinct monitoring tasks. She states that policy transparency has to do with 
adequate informational segmentation. Following Issing and Winkler’s argu-
ment, however, it may be argued that informational segmentation does not 
entail transparency segmentation. Informational segmentation can and must 
coexist with full communicative transparency in all segments. This is also 
clear from her discussion of the three Bundesbank audiences, she states that 
each of them intervenes in different cases and for different reasons and need 
different information, in different amounts. Any situation in which each 
audience is required to intervene needs to be fully transparent, otherwise the 
audience would not be able to understand a particular situation or carry out 
its monitoring role to the full. Different audiences do not thus merely have 
different informational requirements but may also have different modes of 
understanding and may therefore require different languages to be applied 
in communicative exchanges between each of them and a central bank. 
Policy transparency is as much about suitable informational segmentation 
as it is about suitable linguistic segmentation.
This is particularly important when one reconsiders Lohmann’s reading of 
the Bundesbank in the light of her audience cost theory. She points out that 
the general public, regional states and Bundesbank watchers need different 
amounts of information, are interested in different questions, intervene in 
different ways and punish with different degrees of harshness. In the light 
of Issing and Winkler’s view of policy transparency, it is now possible to 
appreciate that the three audiences she considered use different languages 
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for communication and employ different modes of understanding. Bundes-
bank watchers use economics. Regional states intervene against the federal 
government in defence of their regional prerogatives by using legal argu-
ments. Economics and legal doctrine constitute two separate discursive fi elds 
coordinating different types of rationality, and therefore different modes of 
understanding, where the tradition of law and economics has not gained 
a dominant position within the legal profession and where the network of 
economists and that of legal experts only marginally overlap. The general 
public will have to use modes of understanding that will be only tangentially 
based upon economics or legal doctrine while intervening to adjudicate 
confl icts between the Bundesbank and the federal government. It can be 
expected that the general public will use some kind of ideological device 
to make sense of the battle between the central bank and the government 
(e.g. the public may be keen on interpreting the monetary game as a kind 
of medieval morality play).
By interposing Lohmann with Issing and Winkler, it is therefore possible 
to conclude that a well-designed central bank effi ciently solving the trade-
off between credibility and fl exibility would be a multi-lingual institution 
capable of practising linguistic discrimination in its communicatively 
heterogeneous audiences.
The scope of such conclusion should be emphasised here as it follows implici-
tly both from Lohmann’s audience cost theory and from Issing and Winkler’s 
interpretative approach to the question of transparency. Once the need for 
a central bank to take the modes of understanding into account has been 
accepted (and therefore a central bank’s audiences’ languages), then one can 
no longer assume a priori (or surreptitiously impose) equivalence between 
an economist’s interpretation of the monetary game and that of central bank 
audiences. Nor can one assume equivalence between economists’ functional 
expectations concerning a bank’s tasks and those of its audiences. One must 
be open to the surprising discovery that there may be audiences interpreting 
the monetary game in quite different terms to those employed by econo-
mists; they may constitute the game by using quite different languages and 
they may derive quite different functions which they expect a central bank 
to fulfi l from their different experience of the monetary game. Audiences 
may understand the monetary game not as a game concerning preserving 
the values of their savings but rather as a medieval morality play.
Their functional expectations vis à vis a central bank will thus revolve around 
fulfi lling the symbolic functions that are implied by their understanding 
of the monetary game. These symbolic functions make up a central bank’s 
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invisible statute, regarding which the institutional design literature has been 
mute. Audiences will monitor and judge central bank performance in terms 
of the dimensions which are relevant to them and will reward or sanction a 
central bank on the grounds of central bank fulfi lment of audiences’ func-
tional expectations vis à vis a central bank. It is on this basis that audiences 
will decide whether to support central bank independence.
One must thus expect that different individuals will act as central bank 
watchers, institutional stakeholders or lay public, depending on their mode 
of understanding the monetary game. Economists will no longer be central 
bank watchers as the monetary game shifts away from the monetary arena 
and turns into a game concerning national identity. Historians, philosophers, 
sociologists, political scientists and even writers, poets, artists will rather be-
come central bank watchers, depending on a specifi c community context. If 
the game regarding money turns into a game concerning public morality, then 
moral authorities (secular and religious) within the society in question will 
take up the role of central bank watchers. It should also be emphasised that 
not all central bank audiences are activated at the same time. The audiences 
just referred to above only enter the game after symbolic linkage between 
the monetary arena and their reference areas have been activated.
4. HOW DEMOCRACY HELPS SATISFY COMMUNICATIVE 
PRECONDITIONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL EFFICIENCY
The previous section argued that Lohmann’s audience-cost theory of 
institutional commitment was based upon a much too thin notion of 
communicative heterogeneity, blinding the analyst vis à vis communicative 
preconditions upon which her conclusions are valid. It was suggested that 
her theory requires the thicker notion of communicative heterogeneity un-
derpining Issing and Winkler’s concept of policy transparency for restating 
such preconditions upon which effective audience monitoring depends. It 
is thus possible to understand why a well-designed central bank effi ciently 
solves the trade-off between credibility and fl exibility by being a multi-lin-
gual institution capable of practising linguistic discrimination regarding its 
communicatively heterogeneous audiences.
Two types of local knowledge are relevant for a society’s functioning. The 
fi rst type exclusively resides within an individual and can be effi ciently 
brokered by the market, according to Friedrich von Hayek (1937, 1945). 
The second type resides within groups; it is knowledge regarding a given 
system of inter-subjectively shared meaning and modes of coordinating and 
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producing meaning within such a system. Like a language, the latter serves 
to make the former coherent. Suppose that a community perceives the mo-
netary game as concerning national identity while a different community 
sees it purely in terms of maintaining national currency’s purchasing power. 
Knowledge concerning the way agents within such communities express 
their perception of the monetary game is necessary for deciphering the 
meaning of their actions regarding monetary affairs (their local positional 
knowledge is not automatically revealed by their action).
Many different languages coexist next to each other in any given society, 
market language being just one of them. If it were the only one, it would be 
possible to construct an argument (as Hayek does) on market suffi ciency as 
an institutional framework capable of effi ciently mobilising individual local 
knowledge. Societies, however, represent multi-linguistic environments and 
individual local knowledge must travel across linguistic borders possessing a 
much greater institutional challenge. Some institutions will have to ensure 
that local positional knowledge is exchangeable through contact between 
linguistic communities to mobilise local knowledge throughout distinct 
linguistic communities (local coordination must be fostered at the border of 
contiguous communities). When two communities meet, local coordination 
(and therefore local exchange) between them can be achieved by contact 
languages emerging to enable such exchange. A pluralistic democracy is a 
system that encourages the emergence of such contact languages, thereby 
facilitating the circulation of local positional knowledge across linguistic 
borders; pluralistic democracies can effi ciently carry out this function.
Linguistic communities within a democracy become constituencies by virtue of 
the principle of representation. Such constituencies expect that their representa-
tives pursue their interests. To do so, however, such representatives must be able 
to understand such interests as expressed within the language of coordination 
used within their constituencies. It is in fact this language that gives meaning 
to the interests that they need to represent. Representatives do not thus merely 
compete to satisfy their electorate’s interests. They compete (and must compete) 
among themselves in identifying the coordinating languages employed by the 
various linguistic communities. They compete in producing contact languages 
enabling trade among different communities to expand their constituencies. 
Competition creates an incentive to engage effi ciently in such language-brid-
ging and language-crafting. In this sense, democracy should be thought as an 
institutional framework effi ciently managing local knowledge jointly with the 
market in a multi-linguistic environment and throughout communicatively 
heterogeneous communities.
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It can be concluded that economic institutions benefi t in two ways from 
democracy’s positive communicative externalities. They will be able to 
rely upon a whole repertoire of contact codes that democracy contributes 
towards producing. This will enhance economic institutions’ capability to 
gain access to their communicatively heterogeneous audiences and therefore 
to their understanding of the monetary game. This knowledge is necessary 
for economic institutions to be transparent to such audiences and therefore 
to enable such audiences to correctly perform their monitoring function 
which is ultimately relevant for institutional effi ciency. Democracy repre-
sents an institutional mechanism for economic institutions to rely upon, 
effi ciently bringing about communicative contact between distinct linguistic 
communities.
Economic institutions must be vigilant in all situations in which such a 
function becomes weakened, democracy’s communicative function being 
conducive to economic institutions’ long-term effi ciency; economic institu-
tions must be prepared to take active action to restore functions when they 
become weakened. This sets the background for responding to a frequent 
criticism against independent central banking.
5. HOW AN INSTITUTIONALLY EFFICIENT CENTRAL BANK 
HELPS DEMOCRACY HELP THE BANK BY EMPLOYING 
COMMUNICATIVE EMPOWERMENT
The previous section suggested that democracy is an institutional mecha-
nism that effi ciently brokers a special type of local knowledge and that 
such knowledge matters for institutional effi ciency in independent central 
banking. Democracy is an internal requirement for economic institution 
effi ciency; such conclusion may be used for addressing a frequent criticism 
against central bank independence.
Critics observe that in a global economy formal democratic checks upon 
independent economic agencies increasingly fail to bite and therefore 
economic agencies can increasingly afford to act as autarchic institutions 
eschewing democracy and taking economic rationality as their only guiding 
principle.
It may be suggested that the critics’ conclusion represents a non sequitur in 
the light of the previous sections. Formal democratic institutions’ erosion 
and the emergence of economic rationality as independent economic agen-
cies’ exclusive guiding principle do not imply that independent economic 
agencies can afford to ignore democracy. On the contrary, if such agencies 
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pursue effi ciency (as they should if they are self-consistent about their com-
mitment to economic rationality) they are bound to employ democracy’s 
communicative function as part of their own practices, requiring ack-
nowledging their audiences’ communicative heterogeneity on their part and 
adjusting their internal organisational incentives if they wish to do so.
By acknowledging their audiences’ communicative heterogeneity indepen-
dent central banks will engage in the very same language-bridging function 
that the democratic process performs on a routine basis. Independent central 
banks will translate the incentive generated by the democratic process for 
competitive representation by adjusting their internal organisational incen-
tives into the own practices so as to support the language-bridging effort.
If independent central banking homogenises audiences, then local knowled-
ge becomes destroyed, institutional effi ciency is threatened and democracy 
is trampled on. If independent central banking self-consistently and syste-
matically acknowledges communicative heterogeneity, then local knowledge 
is not dissipated, institutional effi ciency is maintained and democracy is 
reproduced by proxy.
Lohmann (2000, 107-108) has suggested that, “Mature democracies have 
more, and more powerful, and more varied audiences.” Therefore, democracy 
is functional to institutional effi ciency by creating the conditions for complex 
monitoring. One can then argue that complex monitoring neither follows 
automatically from the variety or large number of audiences per se or from 
their generic social power. If this were the case, then the Soviet system would 
have produced the same effects that Lohmann attributes to democracy since it 
produced many powerful audiences. Instead, it is because democracy creates 
positive incentives for heterogeneous audience language-bridging and lan-
guage-crafting, thereby communicatively empowering such audiences vis à vis a 
central bank that audiences can fulfi l their monitoring task. Communicative 
empowerment is why democratic legitimacy and institutional effi ciency are 
reconcilable in independent central banking and why independent central 
banks are bound to contribute towards strengthening the democratic process 
if they are fully committed to institutional effi ciency.
6. THE WORK AHEAD LIES IN A RESEARCH 
PROGRAMME CONCERNING COMMUNICATION IN 
INDEPENDENT CENTRAL BANKING
Political economists have traditionally been indifferent to the communica-
tive construction of money and central banking in the public sphere. It has 
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been argued that the monetary game’s communicative expression is relevant 
to understanding how independent central banks can achieve institutional 
effi ciency and why they face no trade-off between institutional effi ciency 
and democratic legitimacy. An institutionally effi cient central bank must 
be an agent of communicative empowerment for the audiences forming the 
local context for its operation. Provided that it is effi cient, an independent 
central bank should therefore work towards strengthening democracy rather 
than undermining it.
Analysing the communicative underpinning of institutional effi ciency 
in independent central banking is part of a broader research programme 
concerning communication in central banking. A number of empirical 
questions are of immediate concern for such a programme. The programme 
is particularly aimed at:
• Identifying conceptual tools central banks will need to access vernacular 
languages used by their audiences when expressing their experience of 
the monetary process;
• Identifying conceptual tools central banks will need to engage in the 
language-bridging and language-crafting required to gain access to such 
vernacular languages;
• Defi ning central banks’ organisational requirements for self-consistently 
and systematically meeting and effi ciently managing their audiences’ 
communicative heterogeneity;
• Designing the academic curricula that will produce professional profi les 
apt to meet those organisational requirements;
• Defi ning monetary constitutions’ communicative provisions for setting 
independent central banks’ incentives for managing communicative 
heterogeneity;
• Designing political institutions’ control procedures for checking inde-
pendent central banks’ correct application of the monetary constitution’s 
communicative provisions; and
• Assisting parliamentary commissions responsible for controlling inde-
pendent central banks in verifying the central banks’ effi ciency creden-
tials. This paper has explained that effi ciency credentials have also to do 
with managing independent central bank communication. Controlling 
effi ciency credentials automatically presupposes controlling democratic 
credentials.
132 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMÍA 42, 2005
To address such empirical questions, a research programme concerned with 
communication in independent central banking will need to draw from 
(and systematically connect) the following bodies of literature:
• Traditional institutional design literature concerning central banking 
political economy;
• Literature on robustness in complex systems3;
• Game-theory literature regarding shared knowledge and culture4;
• Political economy literature regarding expressive rationality5; and
• Literature concerning cultural studies and the sociology of scientifi c 
knowledge6.
In terms of methodology in this fi eld, research will need to draw on game 
theory, computational methods in complex systems, experimental design, 
discourse analysis, sociological intervention and collaborative and partici-
pative methodologies.
A research programme concerning communication in central banking is 
also bound to take active part in the debate over globalisation. Karl Brunner 
(1981) suggested that,
The protective effect of the mystique lowers public accountability of central 
bank behaviour and offers increased opportunities for exploiting monetary 
powers for political purposes. It also raises the likelihood of mismanagement 
due to sheer ignorance and incompetence. This is particularly serious when 
we recognise that the world’s central bank managers form probably a random 
collection hardly conducive to systematic selection of competent and knowled-
geable personnel. This does not deny the intermittent occurrence of truly 
outstanding managers of central banks, or of managers having the wisdom and 
courage to rationally adjust operations to the uncertain knowledge available to 
us. But these managers remain an exception (Brunner 1981, 19-20).
3  The Santa Fe Institute programme reading list on robustness in natural, engineering and 
social systems is particularly useful. See Padgett and Ansell (1993), Jen (2001).
4  See Chwe (2001).
5  See Schuessler (2000).
6  See Shils (1975), Alexander and Smith (1993), Alexander (2001), Turner (1974), Sahlins 
(1981) and Galison (1997).
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A close study of communication in independent central banking will enable 
analysts to distinguish between those situations in which local policy-makers 
deviate from standard economic protocol out of sheer incompetence from 
those situations when they deviate on the grounds of their direct access to 
the type of local knowledge that is embodied in local communities’ discur-
sive practice. What is relevant to central bank operations and what is not 
directly accessible to external observers must also be distinguished; their 
deviation in the latter case will be the product of higher-order rationality 
rather than a lack of rationality.
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